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The World Wide Fund for Nature tagged it ‘The Year the World Caught Fire’.  In 1997–8 the 
coupled ocean-atmosphere system, the El Niño Southern Oscillation, went through an 
especially intense version of one its periodic changes in direction. Drought came to 
characteristically humid regions—desiccating tropical rainforests, while heavy rain fell on 
normally arid zones. Both of which, environmental historian Stephen Pyne (2001) explains, 
plumped up fuel loads in their respective ecosystems. Where there is fuel there will be fire, 
whether the spark comes from natural sources like lightning or from human ignition.  Soon 
tens of thousands of blazes were raging across Australia and Amazonia, and from Siberia to 
Sumatra.  
As Pyne (2001: 172) wryly observes the ‘fires were telegenic, they were timely’. Television, 
itself a pulsing and flickering of light, has an affinity with fire. Tracking the blazes around the 
Pacific Rim and across the Americas, global media knew it was onto a winning topic. This 
was a time of ascending anxiety about human induced global warming, but neither figures of 
rising atmospheric carbon concentration nor global circulation models offered much in the 
way of visceral sensory charge. What the mass-mediated spectacle of the world’s forests 
ablaze provided was the graphic interface that global warming had been lacking: here was an 
infernal iconography fitting for an era of runaway planetary heating (Pyne 2001).   
If the 1980s and 1990s were decades when capital seemed to be roving the globe with 
unprecedented license, so too they were a moment when environmentalists were increasingly 
developing transborder tactics and alliances, as were climatologists and environmental 
scientists (Tsing 2005). While 1997–8 was neither the first nor the last year of widespread 
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wildfire, the tropical rainforests that burnt in those seasons were a focus for the political 
problematisation of transboundary environmental threats. But fire, in this sense, may be more 
than just one more ascendant object of political concern. It is the propensity of fire to sear its 
way across the Earth’s surface and to transform the air in which we see, move and breathe, 
that makes it the kind of event that troubles the relationship between politics and the stuff of 
the world. Pyne (1997a: 5) points to an emergent understanding that localised fire is 
inseparable from the Earth’s atmosphere, adding up to what he describes as a ‘new 
mythological metamorphosis’ in which air ‘joins fire anywhere with fire everywhere’. 
Analogously, for philosopher Michael Marder (2015: 4), a planetary convergence of 
combustive processes and their atmospheric impacts is recomposing politics at the most 
elemental level. ‘Our situation today’, he declares, ‘is that of neither land nor sea; updated 
for the twenty-first century, the central political elements are the dyad of air and fire’. 
This chapter explores the idea of fire as a shifting and changeable elemental process that 
poses challenges to all who set out to manage parcels of the Earth’s surface.  At the same 
time, skilled operators can use fire to enrich and help secure a land or place of dwelling.   If 
there is no inhabited region of the Earth where fire is not to some degree integral to the 
carving out and sustaining of territories, fire is also increasingly experienced as a 
transboundary force that can unsettle received understandings of territory as stable and 
enduring.  As we will see, it is this combination of being at once local and global, grounded 
and circulatory, site-specific yet planetary in its connections and consequences, that makes 
fire such a provocation for rethinking territorial imaginaries. 
I take my bearings from “The Year the World Caught Fire”, which soon opens out into a 
succession of fiery years, and I focus on the islands of Indonesia —described as one of 
planet’s preeminent frontiers of fire (Pyne 2001). Along with the Amazon, Indonesia—
particularly Kalimantan, the Indonesian bulk of the island of Borneo—has been the site of 
extensive forest burning to make way for plantation agroecosystems. Harmful enough in 
themselves, many such fires have escaped control. Encompassing severe impacts on forest 
habitats and on traditional ways of life, Indonesian fire is a major source of the air pollution 
that plagues much of South East Asia. As well as addressing the causes of Indonesia’s fire 
problem, I consider the collaborative efforts of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) to deal with fire-induced `haze’. 
This account, however, will be far from a simple one about a new transboundary problem 
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engendering novel transnational responses. Despite the efforts of ASEAN members—and 
nongovernmental actors—this story is yet without a happy ending. What is more, the 
question of what a transboundary political issue is or might yet be can draw us beyond even 
the most concerted efforts of contemporary transnational environmental governance. If we 
imagine that the only boundaries that really matter are those inscribed by human actors 
around the parcels of the Earth’s surface we call nation states, then we may already be setting 
our sights too low—or perhaps not low enough. For in a world in which the operating state of 
the Earth system is a matter pressing concern, the thresholds that matter politically are no 
longer simply those that define nation-states, but those that distinguish one state of the Earth 
system or one geological epoch from another.   
Given the well-established role of fossil fuel combustion as a driver of change, fire and its 
entanglement with Earth’s atmosphere is a central concern when it comes to trying to protect 
crucial boundaries in the Earth system.  Here too, Indonesia is a key player, for the 
archipelagic nation is a major exporter of coal. In this chapter, then, I ask how these two 
different kinds of combustion—fire that burns phytomass on the Earth’s surface and fire that 
consumes fossilised biomass from the subsurface—are converging. I consider how they are 
fusing and being confused. For the very idea that all fire is bad fire, that the flaming forests 
are necessarily in collusion with combusting fossil fuels in destabilising the Earth system is 
something we need to question. What makes riveting television in an environmental age may 
not be the best foundation for a fire-centred rethinking of territory through and beyond terra.  
As both Pyne and Marder suggest, fire may well have been a formidable and constitutive 
force in politics for much longer than most of us imagine. Moreover, when we start to think 
in a searching way about the great subterranean beds of fossilised hydrocarbons now causing 
so much climatic and earth system strife, their existence raises questions about how stable 
and immutable the ground beneath our feet has been. For just as the fire that drifts across the 
boundary between one nation state and another can perturb our sense of what constitutes a 
given political territory, so too can the fires that blaze across the boundary between one 
geological epoch and another unsettle our sense of the givenness of the Earth itself.   
 
Territorialising Fire  
During the extreme El Niño episodes of 1982–3 and 1997–8 even evergreens in the normally 
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lush tropical forest of Sumatra and Kalimantan shed their leaves, providing the dry biomass 
conducive to wildfire outbreak (Pyne 2001).  But “normal” needs qualifying. As fire scientist 
Johann Goldammer (2007: 14) points out: ‘Fire has been present in the Southeast Asian biota 
since the Pleistocene. Long-term climate variability (glacial vs. nonglacial climate) and short-
term climate oscillations caused by the El Niño–Southern Oscillation event have repeatedly 
created conditions that make even rainforest susceptible to wildfires’.  
While I will not be exonerating the political or economic actors behind the latest outbreaks of 
intentional fire, it is vital to look at the broader socio-material context in which Indonesia 
burns. Alongside the syncopated inter-annual rhythms of El Niño, it is the alternating annual 
wet-dry cycles of the Asian monsoon that make fire as crucial an element of the 
biogeography of the Indonesian archipelago as rainfall or moisture (Pyne 1997b). And for 
perhaps 800,000 years, fire-wielding hominids have been part of this ecology. The East 
Indies, in Pyne’s (1997b: 418) words, is ‘one of the great hearths of anthropogenic fire’. For 
thousands of years shifting cultivators have followed fire-fallow regimes—what is often 
described as ‘swidden’ or, in more discerning indigenous vocabulary, jhum, kaingin or 
lading. The distribution of teak and other hardwoods, spices and many tropical fruits is 
believed to be in large measure an expression of this fire-catalysed gardening  (Pyne 1997b).  
It is important to recognise that Indonesian fire is not the same as European fire.  This matters 
because in the context of colonisation, emissaries from Europe took it upon themselves to 
manage land across much of the rest of the Earth’s surface, including the East Indies.  What 
Europeans so often failed to understand was that in many parts of the world  – especially the 
tropics – fire is a necessary preparatory phase of agriculture (Pyne 2001, 88).   As Pyne 
(1997b: 420) writes of the European colonial encounter with Indonesia: ‘Europe didn’t trust 
roving villages, didn’t believe shifting cultivation was sustainable, didn’t ascribe value to 
“minor forest products” that foraging natives did, and didn’t like fire’.  
The roots of this European distrust of fire and of fire-fallow people’s farming are deep and 
complex. North-west and central Europe, Pyne explains, is unusual for its perennial 
dampness—for the absence of wet and dry rhythms that lend the Indonesian archipelago and 
much of the rest of the world a distinctive fire season.  European soils, churned and 
revitalised by geologically recent glaciation, are exceptionally tolerant of the ongoing 
ecological disturbance that is agriculture (Pyne 2001; 1997b). This enabled Europe to become 
an anomalous patch of the Earth so intensely cultivated that fire can be almost totally 
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domesticated—extinguished in the wild and reduced to little more than a farming implement 
(Clark and Yusoff 2014; Pyne 2001).     
Even so, the periodic firing of forest and the regular burning of fallow remained the 
cornerstone of European agroecosystems for millennia, as it was in Indonesia and most other 
places where agriculture was practiced.  But then in early modernity, fire suppression in 
Europe took a further turn, without parallel anywhere else in the world. “Enlightened” 
agronomists, newly converted to the idea of endless spirals of economic accumulation, 
became convinced that surplus organic matter needed to be cycled back into soil or forest 
rather than “squandered” in flame (Pyne 1997b). At the same time, metropolitan authorities, 
anxious about the incendiary inclinations of the urban masses, were ever more disposed to 
see open fire as an expression of social breakdown and disorder. As Michel Foucault (1991) 
so influentially depicted, modernising states during this period were increasingly concerned 
with the qualities of their territory—taking upon themselves the responsibility to optimize the 
wealth and vitality of the spaces and populations under their jurisdiction. 
As Europe’s burgeoning urban masses were being induced to channel and augment their 
bodily energies, so too were its peasant farmers being compelled to quench their fires and 
desist from torching fallow—in the interests of tightening the energetic circuits of agricultural 
production. It’s no coincidence that the institution of curfew to constrain the spatio-temporal 
movements of urban bodies is derived from couvre feu—the covering or quelling of fire 
(Clark, 2011; Pyne 2001). Such insights suggest that the definitive modalities, tactics and 
practices of governing territory that crystallised in a modernising Europe had at their heart a 
certain orientation to fire. But it was a disposition so utterly intent on fire’s exorcism that 
European thinkers have rarely dwelled on the fiery underbelly of political modernity. Or as I 
put it elsewhere:  
it is perhaps only in Europe that we could imagine a “biopolitics” that was not 
first and foremost a ‘pyropolitics’—centred on the regulation, manipulation and 
enhancement of fire. Or is what we have come to call biopolitics, already, 
covertly, a set of practices concerning the governance of what can be burned, 
how, where and by whom? (Clark 2011,164–5). 
If in the course of their drive for global expansion Europeans were willing to displace their 
repressed desire to burn onto distant lands, as the imperative to govern in “productive” and 
“optimising” ways was extended to colonial territories such as the East Indies so, too, were 
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sanctions against open fire. What began as a provincial mutation, a geographically and 
culturally specific renunciation of fire, was gradually assembled into a global norm: a set of 
prohibitions that cultivators, pastoralists and forest dwellers the world over were expected to 
abide by. As Pyne (1997b: 495) admonishes: ‘the principles of fire conservancy became a 
dogma of British—indeed, of European—environmental policy. In what is surely one of the 
most paradoxical outcomes of European expansion, some of the most pyrophobic peoples on 
the planet assumed control over some of the Earth’s most pyrophilic biotas’.  
The East Indies caught the full force of this attempt to excise fire from constitutively fire-
prone ecosystems. Europeans were certainly not immune to learning from novel 
environments or from harsh experience. Indeed, as environmental historian Richard Grove 
(1995) notes, much of the early imperative towards early forms of conversation came from 
observations that deforesting tropical lands—especially islands—could lead to desiccation, 
erosion, and even total biotic collapse. For authorities tasked with enhancing the “natural” 
productivity of the larger islands of the East Indies, it seemed as though fire reduction was 
the key to keeping landscapes well-watered and fertile.  
While the earlier Dutch colonists of the late eighteenth century grasped that intentional use of 
fire was deeply entrenched and of customary significance, later colonial administrators—
justifiably concerned over the impacts of commercial logging operations—turned to fire 
control as the pathway to watershed protection (Pyne 1997b). But undiscerning fire 
proscription quickly came up against the fire-inducing wet-dry pulsing of both the Asian 
monsoon and El Niño; more than this, injunctions against burning met with vigorous 
resistance by indigenous peoples. ‘The more the Dutch objected to fire’, observes Pyne 
(1997b: 423), ‘the more often the natives were inclined to use it’. In the process, colonial 
foresters intent on harvesting teak missed the point that the deciduous, semi tropical 
hardwood tree flourished where it was exposed to regular fire.  
We can view this as a collision between competing ways of territorialising fire. Europe 
became a site in which the suppression of fire’s mobile, mutable aspects played a key part in 
the fixing and bounding of territory at scales ranging from the farm to the nation.  Indeed, 
pyropolitics—collective decision-making over fire—may well have played a much greater 
role in the characteristic grounding or stabilisation of territory in the `Old World’ than most 
political theorists have acknowledged. The rural people of the East Indies had their own 
pyropolitics: their own ways of setting fire to work to shape, manage and render productive 
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specific pockets of land. But like the element of fire itself, these territories tended to shift and 
transform in response to environmental variability.  
Over the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, official policy in the East Indies was 
a variant of the European territorialising of fire. Fire suppression combined with irrigation 
was at the core of colonial strategies to substitute new export commodities such as coffee and 
sugar for fire-catalysed shifting cultivation across the inner islands of Indonesia (Pyne 
1997b). Fire, needless to say, persisted. With independence came a relaxation of fire 
prohibition, but this change was hardly in the interest of traditional fire-fallow farming or the 
ecosystems it promoted. By the 1980s, concern over expanding populations and the belief 
that accelerating economic growth was the answer to political instability led to state-
supported expansion to the “outer islands”, especially Sumatra and Kalimantan (Tsing 2005). 
This time around, logging and plantation agriculture were to reach deep into the inland 
tropical rainforests, into an interior that had proven resistant to even the most avid colonial 
improvers. And fire was the most economical and convenient means of clearing the land.    
 
Fire as a Transboundary Problem  
As Pyne (1997a; 2001) insists, ideas about fire are both cultural and geographically 
specific—although, like flames, they tend to migrate and insinuate themselves in new 
environments. Neither inherently good nor bad, wildland fire is a manifestation of the 
different elements—oxygen, fuel-loads, ignition source, topography, weather conditions—
that it brings together in what is always a unique event (Pyne 2014). But some blazes are 
exceptional. Since the early 1980s, fires that have been searing through the Indonesian 
interior have turned periodic combustive events into conflagrations too wide-ranging and 
incessant to allow for recovery and regrowth—which is often the point. 
Until the 1970s, the tropical rainforests of Kalimantan and Sumatra had escaped large-scale 
logging, their very biodiversity presenting too much heterogeneity to suit the industrial 
harvester. From then on, a state-sponsored “New Order’” offering concessions to overseas 
corporations opened the way to a regime of mechanised extraction, quickly elevating 
Indonesia to the world’s leading exporter of tropical timber (Tsing 2005). Regeneration was 
not a priority. Once commercially valuable wood was removed, the remaining vegetation was 
frequently burnt off to clear the ground and fertilise the soil for plantation crops. Prising open 
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the canopy resulted in drier microclimates, increasing the susceptibility of surrounding forest 
to further fire (Herawati and Santoso 2011). By the early 1980s, fire-driven rainforest 
conversion was generating an annual pall of airborne aerosol pollution—euphemistically 
termed haze— blanketing Indonesia and neighbouring nations. 
The El Niño-compounded fire season of 1997–8 burned over eight million hectares across 
Kalimantan and Sumatra, creating acrid haze that affected the health of some 75 million 
people in the region, and exacting serious socio-economic impacts across six South East 
Asian nations. The smoke reduced rainfall, exacerbating the El Niño effect and increasing 
forest flammability. As well as having serious impacts on regional agriculture and biological 
diversity, the atmospheric effects of the fires helped elevate Indonesia to one the world’s 
highest carbon dioxide emitters (Mayer 2006).  
In the early years of the transboundary haze problem, traditional fire-fallow cultivators and 
migrant farmers were frequently held to blame. By the early 2000s, satellite imaging cross-
referenced with concession maps linked plantation companies to 80 per cent of the fires 
(Varkkey 2013), with land clearance for the burgeoning palm oil industry regarded as the 
leading incentive for burning (Jones 2004). While using fire to clear land is technically illegal 
under Indonesian law, liability is hard to establish. In the messy ground-level reality of 
rainforest “development”, smaller fires accidently grow into larger fires or can be encouraged 
to become so. Fire can be deliberately used to degrade “pristine” rainforest so it can be 
legally reclassified as convertible to plantation farming. Palm oil and rubber companies and 
other big operators devolve “land preparation” to a host of unregulated and ephemerally 
operating sub-contractors, some of whom reputedly set fires on villagers’ lands and allow it 
to spread to where it is required (Varkkey, 2013). 
Indeed, it is fire’s propensity to overflow lines and markers inscribed on the surface of the 
Earth that helps make it such a recalcitrant object of regulation, a challenge no less 
complicated in relation to the transboundary effects of smoke. When it came to engaging with 
the increasingly intolerable effects of air pollution, it was fortuitous that the affected 
populations/governments were already members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the political and economic organization founded in 1967 by Indonesian, 
Malaysian and Singaporean governments—and subsequently expanded to include Brunei, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar/Burma. ASEAN’s 
response to the haze problem has been widely praised, with the United Nations Environment 
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Programme, amongst others, commending the Association’s collaborative air pollution 
mitigation efforts as a potential global model for addressing transboundary issues (see 
Varkkey 2012). 
Despite political regime changes, Indonesia’s own leadership has remained steadfastly 
committed to export-led economic growth, and has tended to tolerate haze and carbon 
emission problems as regrettable side effects of the drive for prosperity. ‘Environmental 
protection is weighed against economic concerns,’ political scientist Christopher Atkinson 
(2014: 254) observes, and it has been rare for the former to tip to the balance. But Indonesia’s 
lack of concern with the wider impacts of its “frontier of fire” has not necessarily been out of 
keeping with international law and policy. Even the 1992 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment affirms each state’s ‘sovereign right to utilize, manage and develop 
their forests’— with no explicit reference to international cooperation over forest fire 
prevention (cited Robinson 2001: 463). This oversight seems to stem from the assumption 
that all nations would properly attend to their own forest fires rather than implying any 
reconciliation with forest fire per se. 
Held between 1992 and 1996, ASEAN’s workshops on transboundary haze and the resultant 
Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution certainly showed promise (Jones 2004; 
Robinson 2001); as did the more demanding Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, 
signed by six member states in November 2002. The latter initiative—effectively an 
international treaty—stresses prevention and monitoring of transboundary haze, including 
inter-state cooperation in developing early warning systems, fire-fighting capability and 
preventive measures such as education, awareness-building and community participation  
(ASEAN 2016). But while the Agreement is legally binding on signatory states, critical 
commentators note that ASEAN’s foundational principles of non-interference in each other’s 
domestic affairs compromises the Agreement’s effectiveness (Jones 2004). This limitation 
was compounded by Indonesia’s delay in ratifying the agreement until 2014—making it the 
last of the signatories to fully commit. 
A certain softening of the ASEAN hard line on respecting sovereign space is suggested by 
joint ventures such as Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia’s collaboration in cloud-seeding 
operations to extinguish fires in East Sumatra and West Kalimantan in 2005 – which was 
significant because it involved sharing national airspace and the possibility of redirecting 
rainfall across international borders (Mayer 2006). Critics note, however, that the root causes 
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of forest burning are inadequately addressed by the technical focus of such actions or by the 
Haze Agreement’s central provisions more broadly (Mayer 2006). Much comes down to the 
Indonesian government’s inability or unwillingness to enforce its environmental laws, a 
failure attributed to entrenched patronage relationships between the state and powerful 
corporate actors (Jones 2004; Varkkey 2012). Such complicity between political and 
economic elites characterises ASEAN member states more generally, as does the 
prioritisation of economic development over environmental protection (Robinson 2001).  
It is important to recall that Indonesia is not the only ASEAN nation in which fire is used to 
clear forest (Jones 2004), and that Malaysian and Singaporean companies contribute 
significantly to Indonesian forest burning (Mayer 2006). In brief, plantation agriculture is big 
business across much of the region, and maximising growth and profitability in this sector is 
viewed as a keystone of economic and political stability in the region (Jones 2004). As 
Varkkey (2012: 83) pointedly concludes:  ‘ASEAN initiatives on haze have resulted in 
outcomes that protect national economic interests, preserve state sovereignty, and deflect 
responsibility on the haze issue, instead of actually reducing or eradicating haze’. 
Increasing pressure from environmental NGOs in Indonesia and across the region, a 
concerted ASEAN response to the severe fire season of 2013, and Indonesia’s belated 
ratification of the Transboundary Haze Agreement suggest that the governance of forest 
burning in South East Asia is an unfinished story. As the haze problem drives home, the 
quality of daily life in the streets of Kuala Lumpur or Singapore is intimately linked to what 
happens deep in the forests of Kalimantan and Sumatra. Just as fire sears its way across 
ground-level administrative borderlines and demarcations, so too do its airborne effects drift 
across national boundaries and enmesh themselves in the global atmosphere. In this way, the 
fearsome dyad of air and fire continues to test interstate capacities, provoking national, 
regional and international actors to forge new alliances and agreements. 
At the same time, however, there is much in the regional haze problem that is resoundingly 
familiar: the recalcitrance of territorial sovereignty, nation-based preoccupations with 
economic performance, and the unfaltering ease with which capital crosses borders relative to 
those agencies that would constrain or limit its actions.  
 
Combustion and the Politics of Strata  
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As environmental lawyer Nicholas Robinson (2001: 504) intones on the Indonesian 
predicament: ‘Forest fires are a clear and present danger, not merely to territory within a 
nation, but globally and transnationally’. Reviewing the use of fire in Indonesia by powerful 
plantation and logging interests for forest conversion —and its biospheric and atmospheric 
repercussions—one could hardly disagree. But not all the implications and complications of 
combustion are quite so clear and present. And territory—usually taken to mean the 
exclusive parcelling out of the Earth’s surface between more or less sovereign states—is not 
necessary the first or last word in political probity, even when these bounded spaces are over-
flowed by unruly and transgressive forces. 
Thus far, for all our attending to irruptions, driftings, circulations—we have still been focused 
on or over the Earth’s surface—on events that play out on a globe whose curvature and 
contours are laid out before us. But the fires we have been tracking also draw us downward, 
into an underworld that is both part of the planet’s deep past and implicated in its possible 
futures. For the combustion that is now taking place in Indonesia, I want to suggest, is 
enmeshed not only with the sociopolitical formations of polities such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
or Singapore, but imbricated with the geological formations of the Eocene, the Miocene and 
the Pliocene—and whatever epochs are yet to come.  And this traversing of the Earth’s strata 
raises challenges to territorial imaginations every bit as profound as flows that move across 
the planet’s surface.  
ASEAN’s Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was followed by the Peatland 
Management Strategy (ASEAN 2006). Indonesia contains some 53 per cent of the world’s 
tropical peatlands, and much of this area was burnt in the 1982–3 and 1997–8 fire seasons. 
Peat swamps contain considerable biodiversity and are vital components of the global carbon 
cycle. It is estimated that in 1997 these peat fires generated the equivalent of 40 per cent of 
the world’s fossil fuel carbon emissions (Chokkalingum, Kurniawan and Ruchiat 2005).   
While the draining and firing of Indonesia’s peat swamps is a well-publicised environmental 
threat, less attention has been given to the ignition of coal seams by forest fires. The areas of 
Sumatra and Kalimantan where forest burning has been most extensive are also the sites of 
90 per cent of Indonesia’s coal reserves. Here, forest fires frequently ignite exposed coal 
seams and whereas forest and peat fires burn out or are extinguished by rainfall coal fires can 
smoulder for decades. Researchers estimate there are up to 3000 coal fires burning in East 
Kalimantan, any one of which can ignite new forest fires (Whitehouse and Mulyana 2004).  
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Added to these accidental ignitions is the massive intentional exhuming and burning of fossil 
fuel deposits.  Indonesia—the world’s largest exporter of thermal coal—is a significant 
contributor (Belkin 2009: 261). Going against global trends for downsizing coal reserves, 
Indonesia is one of few nations for which known reserves have being growing, with deposits 
estimated at 57 trillion tons in the early 2000s (Fatah 2008). Concentrated in East and South 
Kalimantan and South Sumatra provinces, annual coal production has risen from 130 million 
tonnes in 2005 to a 2014 total of 458 million tonnes (BP 2015; Fatah 2008).   
Coal—like petroleum—is effectively sunshine structured into biomass, compressed, 
transmuted and sequestered beneath the Earth’s surface. Despite the evidence linking the 
burning of fossil fuels with global environmental change, mobilising nation states into 
effective action to mitigate these changes has proved to be a formidable political challenge. 
Although critical scientific witnesses insist that the outcome of the 2015 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Paris is nowhere near sufficient to prevent dangerous climate 
change (Anderson 2015), it is noteworthy that for the first time that delegates agreed in 
principle that a significant proportion of known fossil fuel reserves must remain in the 
ground.   
ASEAN officials, convening on the side-lines of the Paris Conference, set the region the task 
of controlling its forest fires and becoming largely `haze free’ by 2020. As Faizal Parish, 
director of the Malaysian-based Global Environment Centre puts it: ‘Without stopping 
peatland fires and degradation, ASEAN will continue to be a major emitter of greenhouse 
gases’ (cited in Wangkiat 2015: n.p.). Indonesia’s ratification of the Transboundary Haze 
Pollution Agreement is obviously crucial. Currently the world’s sixth largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, Indonesia’s ranking is raised by the exceptionally high proportion of its 
emissions arising from deforestation and land-use change; this also contributes to the 
excessive level of the carbon intensity of the Indonesian economy. At just under 1000 tonnes 
of greenhouse gas emitted per million dollars of Gross Domestic Product (the global average 
is 372 tonnes), Indonesia’s emissions intensity is by far the highest in the world (Ge et al. 
2014).  
But what such a hefty deforestation component in the national carbon tally means in practice 
is that Indonesia and a number of its ASEAN fellow members can propose more-or-less 
acceptable targets for overall emission reduction without significantly cutting fossil fuel 
consumption (Witoelar, in Rappler.com 2015).  As Malaysia’s undersecretary of climate 
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change makes plain, immediate reductions in the region’s reliance on coal are unlikely 
(Theseira, in Wangkiat 2015). That may be an understatement. The Indonesian government 
plans to construct 119 new coal-fired power plants, aiming to have 20 gigawatts of coal-fired 
capacity in place by 2020 (Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit 2016, 20-21). Much of this 
coal will be supplied from opencast mining and mountain top removal (Fatah 2008). 
However, there are signs that local resistance over air pollution concerns, especially on the 
populous island of Java, may be slowing progress (Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit 
2016: 20–1). 
These matters bring us to a `deeper’ point. Some 60 to 70 million years ago, when the present 
Indonesian islands were part of the Sundaland sub-continent, rifting tectonic plates in the 
region produced shallow basins that were infilled by fluvial deposits. Here, peat swamps 
flourished. Peat development—which eventually produced Indonesia’s relatively young coal 
beds—took place during warm, wet climatic phases strung out over the next 40 million years, 
including the early and mid-Eocene, the late Oligocene and the early Miocene, tailing off 
during a glacial episode in global climate, then resuming around five million years ago in the 
Early Pliocene (Belkin 2009; Davis, Noon and Harrington 2007). In short, the events that 
produced the fossilised hydrocarbons that Indonesia is now adding to the global carbon 
budget are the product of a tectonically active zone on what is an exceptionally tectonically 
active and climatically changeable planet. Indeed, as geologist Jan Zalasiewicz (2008: 14–5) 
reminds us, there is no astronomical body in the solar system whose tectonic plates are so 
mobile and whose geological strata are so rich and varied as those of the Earth. 
From the surface layers of biological life, through the shallow stratum of recently deposited 
peat, and into the multiple strata of coal and its companion lithic layers, the issues of 
combustion in Indonesia draw us ‘vertically’ into the deep, geological time-space of the Earth 
(see Clark 2016; Elden 2013). This is immediately politically troublesome terrain. When it 
comes to Kalimantan’s problem of forest fires that ignite coal seams, or coal seams that set 
forests alight, it is by no means clear which government departments ought to be responding:  
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources …was certain coal fires were not 
their responsibility. MEMR’s position was that while some coal fires occur within 
the areas of active mines where they have jurisdiction, they most often occur in 
forests, parklands and rural neighborhoods where they have no jurisdiction. 
(Whitehouse and Mulyana 2004: 93) 
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But the problem is bigger than this, for what the issue of extracting and combusting fossil 
fuels raises is the challenge of how to manage our transactions with the substrata of the Earth. 
To put it another way, where the haze problem is transboundary in the international sense, the 
question of whether or not to exhume and burn fossilised hydrocarbons concerns the possible 
transgressing of geologic boundaries. More than a matter of a collection of sovereign states 
trying to balance their interests, the challenge of “managing” global climate or attempting to 
“govern” Earth systems requires economic agents to renegotiate their relationships with 
geologic body of the Earth (see Rockström et al. 2009). Climate change and Earth system 
change raise the possibility of a dynamic Earth lurching into a new operating state—or even a 
novel geological epoch, as the Anthropocene thesis proposes. The triggers of these 
transformations are anthropogenic processes of exhuming and setting to work the productions 
of past geological periods, and also involve the inherent changeability of the Earth system. 
And this means that the collective responses called forth are at once a politics of territory and 
flow and a politics of strata (Clark, 2014; 2017).  
It is worth recalling that the Earth’s atmosphere is also stratified, though these layers flow 
and recompose themselves much faster than the rocky material of the Earth’s crust.  Smoke 
from Indonesia’s burning biomass enters turbulent and circulating currents of the 
troposphere—the lowest, most mobile stratum of the atmosphere—through which it is 
transported over neighbouring regions.  And it is here, in the troposphere, that the two 
different kinds of `transboundary’ combustion we have been talking about—burning 
phytomass on the Earth’s surface and burning fossilised hydrocarbons from the subsurface—
come together.  For especially above dense urban centres like Singapore or Bangkok, smoke 
from forest fires forms a toxic admixture with emissions that come from motor vehicles, 
industry and other forms of combusting fossil fuel (Aiken, 2004).   
As a political issue that involves both the stratification of the Earth’s lithic crust and the 
atmosphere, governing fossil fuel combustion would seem to fit well within recent research 
that explores how the project of making and maintaining territory is now being extended 
vertically or volumetrically (Elden, 2013). However, little of this work has yet seriously 
considered the dynamic nature of the processes that generate the Earth’s rocky or atmospheric 
strata. For as Earth scientists insist, strata-forming processes are incessantly active, and the 
uppermost layers of the Earth’s crust are in constant interaction with the swirling mobility of 
air, water and life at the planet’s surface (Zalasiewicz et al. 2017). As a reaction that 
integrates air, water, life and rock, fire is a vital part of this dynamic interchange. But if 
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inherited political architectures struggle to come to terms with socio-material processes that 
overflow bounded constructions of territory, arguably we are even more stymied by the 
challenge of elemental forces that well up from the geological depths of the Earth.  In short, it 
is not only that modern territorial imaginaries have tended to focus overwhelmingly on land 
rather than the relatively mobile elements of sea, air, ice or life, it is that `terra’ itself – 
viewed in the long term - is a much more shifting and mutable entity than most political 
thinkers or practitioners have assumed. In the concluding section, I tease out some of these 
themes in the context of the fraught politics of Indonesia’s multiple layers of combustion. 
Here, too, I return to the idea that all politics is, sooner or later, pyropolitical, and consider 
the urgency and complexity of today’s pyropolitics. 
Pyropolitics for a Dynamic Planet  
Europe, as recalled earlier, has a paucity of wildland fire and a peculiar cultural intolerance of 
open flame. But fire does have a “positive” role in the iconography of European politics and 
culture. An inextinguishable flame symbolises belonging to family, community, and nation. 
As Martin Heidegger muses, `the hearth, the homestead of the homely, is Being itself in 
whose light and radiance, glow and warmth, all beings already have gathered’ (cited in 
Capobianco 2010: 62). This hearth around which the community gathers—the ontological 
ground of the polis—is emphatically an enclosed and domesticated fire. In the western 
tradition, going back to the Greeks, the hearth is literally fixed to the ground, and in this way 
it is ‘identified with the earth, immobile and stable’ (de Beistegui 1997: 139). Contained fire, 
in short, is the symbolic counterpart of territorial boundedness and anchoring in an enduring 
Earth.  However, for all Heidegger’s commitment to Earth-rooted community, even he 
recognised that there was something unheimlich—uncanny, unsettling—in the way that flame 
and smoke left the terrestrial abode and wafted up into the heavens (de Beistegui 1997: 139). 
Leave perennially soggy Europe and venture into the wet-dry pulsing of the tropics and fire 
becomes ‘unhomely’ in ways Heidegger never dreamed of. But these are latitudes in which 
there are peoples at home with open fire, cultures for whom selectively burning vegetated 
land has long been the fulcrum of their sustenance and relations with a living world.  Fire for 
them is a means of carving out and shaping territory—but territory that tends to be porously 
bounded and inclined to move in synch with environmental rhythms and flows.  In the 
‘environmental era’, however, European bias against burning biomass still commands 
authority. ‘A world war fought on its own soil and the postwar loss of empire did little to 
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diminish Europe’s influence on global fire,’ laments Pyne (1997: 532). Shades of lingering 
European fire aversion might be discerned in the 2008 UN Initiative on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), launched in 2008, which is currently 
rolling out financial incentives across the developing world to promote the shift from 
swiddening to more commercial agroecosystems. Indonesia, a prime recipient, hosts 44 
projects.  
As Alan Ziegler and his colleagues (2012: 3095) observe: ‘Indonesia’s REDD+ strategy 
proposes agricultural intensification (permanent cropland) and planting of oil palm and trees 
for pulp and timber (plantations) as alternatives to unsustainable forest harvest and slash-and-
burn agriculture’.   Contra REDD directives, their study of rural Indonesia demonstrates the 
superiority of long fallow swidden systems over monoculture and agroforestry for long-term 
carbon capture. Ziegler et al. (2102: 3096) encourage further research that delves beneath the 
cycling of carbon through living phytomass, calling for ‘particular focus on below-ground 
carbon, which can sway decisions regarding optimal land use’. This conclusion resonates 
with earlier work by atmospheric chemist and Anthropocene theorist Paul Crutzen, who 
questioned the validity of studies derogating tropical swidden agriculture and suggested that 
some forms of burning biomass were ‘possible net sinks for atmospheric CO2’  (Crutzen and 
Seiler 1980: 241). As Goldammer and Crutzen (1993: 11) later concluded in work that set out 
to integrate the fields of wildland fire science and atmospheric chemistry; ‘the preservation 
and study of fire will assist humanity in its larger stewardship of the Earth’. 
The connection, via Crutzen, to the Anthropocene thesis is significant, for it reminds us that 
fire is intimately linked to the different states through which the Earth system has passed and 
to processes of geological transition. As Pyne (2014: n.p.) puts it, `the fires of the 
Carboniferous period differ from those of the Permian. Miocene fires rippling over grasslands 
differed from Eocene fires that had no grasses to burn’. Just as fire flourishes at junctures in 
the planet’s mobile crust—the volcano-strewn East African Rift Valley, the Pacific Ring of 
Fire—so too does it proliferate at transitional points in the Earth system. Fire, observes Pyne 
(1994: 890), ‘appears more profusely during times of rapid and extreme climatic change’. 
And this is one reason why fire-wielding hominids need to be ready, need to know what they 
are doing with fire, need the full range of burning practices at their disposal.  
For Homo sapiens across most of the world, fire has been the preeminent means of dealing 
with climatic irregularity.  Skilled application of fire is a way to massage the Earth’s 
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sustaining capacities, to care for land, to forestall larger, fiercer conflagrations. In other 
words, a way to forge and hold territory that befits a dynamic planet. This is why peoples 
who find their customary burning practices prohibited or have alien fires introduced into their 
world tend to respond with the ploy they know best. They set fire. 
Michael Marder’s (2015) searching ruminations on the `pyropolitical’ capture the 
insurrectionary connotations of fire. But as with most Eurocentric accounts of fire these 
reflections lean toward the metaphorical rather than the pragmatic—although he is surely 
right to insist ‘that pyropolitics is co-extensive with the concept and the event of the political’ 
(p.10). Whereas Marder’s collective actors tend to play variations on the theme of fire’s 
insurgent associations, other analysts of political fire emphasise the inseparability of flame as  
symbolic and material force. As an expression of agrarian discontent, rural incendiarism 
belongs ‘to that shadowy realm between crime and protest where it is often no easy matter to 
tell the two apart’ (Rude cited in Kuhlken 1999: 344–5). Christian Kull (2002: 949) adds that 
what may first appear to be acts of politically motivated arson may well turn out to be 
‘straightforward livelihood practice’: that is, traditional land management techniques 
rendered clandestine and revitalized under cover of social unrest. 
Indonesian fire is all this and more. Researchers on Java in the 1960s noted that fire was used 
for clearing land, ‘for hunting, for pleasure, for pestering neighbors or neighboring villages’ 
(van Steenis in Kuhlken 1999: 357). In Kalimantan and Sumatra, clashing land developers 
and small farmers each use fire to assert their rights: ‘Companies used it to stake claims to 
locally held land, and rural dwellers, embittered by several decades of marginalization and 
widespread appropriation of their natural resources, used it to destroy estate crops and timber 
plantations’ (Aiken 2004: 74). As complex in motivation as they are in physical-material 
composition, such fires tend to be extremely difficult to extinguish. 
It is crucial to remember that fires which burn live or recently living phytomass are part of 
the Earth’s constant solar income, whereas fires that consume fossilised biomass dig into a 
kind of geological solar capital. While they both release the energy locked in carbon bonds, 
these fires have very different implications for the Earth system. Pyne (1997a; 2001) insists 
that one of western modernity’s greatest mistakes is to imagine that the contained fire of 
combusting fossil fuels can replace the open fire of burning vegetation. Across much of the 
Earth’s surface—he is not writing about permanent conversion of forested land here—there is 
far too much fossil-fuelled flame but not nearly enough blazing phytomass. And both the 
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superfluity and the shortage are profoundly politically challenging.  
Among ASEAN members, the ongoing tussle with the transboundary haze problem is a 
reminder of how contentious it is to deal with fire within the borders of another nation. At the 
same time, the unresolved issue of global climate change demonstrates the diabolical 
difficulty of trying to manage how nation-states and non-state actors interchange with the 
Earth’s substrata. For there are two different but enmeshed transboundary problems here:  the 
challenge of navigating the boundaries between socio-political formations and the challenge 
of negotiating the boundaries between geological formations. The pyropolitics of territory 
and the pyropolitics of strata are not yet “talking” to each other nearly as much as they need 
to be.  
Mounting scientific evidence suggests that the relatively stable climate the Earth has enjoyed 
over the last 10,500 years may be ending, and that we should expect more instability in the 
Earth system. Fire is one of our species’ time-honoured means of dealing with environmental 
variability, but a changing Earth system will inevitably bring new and strange fires.  Fire can 
never simply be a political act, but is always also to some degree an experiment: a symbolic 
gesture as well as a medium of material intervention, learning, trial and error (Clark 2008; 
2015). In the Indonesian archipelago, pyropolitics poses difficult questions about who gets to 
experiment, where and when. At the same time, it raises the question of how to deal with 
experiments that fall short or go awry.  As they surely will, sooner or later.  For on planet that 
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